There have been small, revisionist powers with a penchant for asymmetric warfare.¹ And there have been small, nuclear-armed powers.² But until Pakistan became nuclear-armed in the late 1980s, inching its way, one cold test at a time, to an air-delivered device a few steps ahead of its larger neighbour, there was no small, revisionist, nuclear-armed state in the world.³ Perhaps North Korea has since travelled a similar path, but its external provocations have had considerably less impact outside its borders than those of Pakistan.⁴

Pakistan’s army has created, encouraged and sheltered non-state armed groups as instruments of war from the very first days of the nation’s existence.⁵ It has supported violent separatist movements, militant Islamist guerrillas and urban terrorist attacks in both Afghanistan and India, ramping up involvement as its nuclear shield matured through the 1990s.⁶ These proxies have failed to wrest Kashmir from India or guarantee a pliant Kabul, and have resulted in drastic blowback within Pakistan itself, in the form of more than 20,000 civilian deaths in the past decade alone.⁷ But they have kept India off balance, forcing it to divert defensive resources away from China and highlighting the shortcomings of the state.
‘It’s a Rubik cube – dealing with Pakistan’, laments a former Indian national security adviser. ‘You keep fiddling with the squares, and as you move one set others are affected or become problems. You don’t have a solution’ (p. 38). Is this a counsel of despair, or obliquely hopeful imagery? After all, Rubik’s cubes can be solved, at least until jumbled once more.

Not War, Not Peace: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism is an effort to think through possible solutions with a level of care and rigour that is unsurpassed either in the published literature or, one suspects, in the corridors of power in New Delhi. George Perkovich is the author of an acclaimed history of India’s nuclear-weapons programme, India’s Nuclear Bomb, published in 1999. His co-author on Not War, Not Peace, Toby Dalton, was a senior policy adviser in the US Department of Energy with service in Pakistan. Both work at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. Writing for Oxford University Press, India, they are sensitive to the emotional edge that the subject carries there, without losing the strategist’s eye for the second- and third-order effects of any given policy choice.

Their book has been lent extraordinary timeliness and importance by the course of events through summer and autumn 2016, with India–Pakistan relations tumbling, violently, to their lowest ebb in a decade. In June, Indian-administered Kashmir erupted in the largest popular protests since the 1990s. India cracked down harshly, blaming Pakistani interference. It also retaliated by highlighting unrest within its neighbour. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave prominent mention to the restive Pakistani province of Balochistan in his Independence Day speech on 15 August, followed by All India Radio intensifying its Balochi-language programming, and New Delhi pointedly granting asylum to Baloch leaders.

It was in this febrile atmosphere that militants entered an Indian Army camp near the Kashmiri town of Uri on 18 September, killing 19 soldiers in the deadliest such attack for 20 years. As with an earlier assault on an air base in nearby Pathankot in January, and despite the Pakistani defence
minister’s grotesque allegation that India had mounted a false-flag attack on itself, the Uri attackers were almost certainly members of one of two groups, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) or Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), each with long-standing and extensive ties to Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Pakistan Army’s spy agency.¹¹

India’s politicians, press and analysts responded with fury, demanding what they saw as long-overdue military retaliation. ‘For one tooth, the complete jaw’, wrote Ram Madhav, the influential general secretary of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). ‘Every Pakistan post through which infiltration takes place should be reduced to rubble’, demanded Gurmeet Kanwal, a retired brigadier who is a prominent voice in Indian defence debates.¹² These views reflected pent-up frustration with what has been described as ‘strategic restraint’, India having abjured military retaliation after large-scale attacks in Kashmir and New Delhi in 2001–02 and in Mumbai in 2008.¹³ It looked briefly as though Modi, who once mocked his predecessors for their pusillanimity on Pakistan, would follow this pattern and stick to a diplomatic response.¹⁴ But on 29 September, Indian officials dramatically announced that special forces had, the previous night, crossed the Line of Control (LoC) which divides Indian from Pakistani Kashmir and conducted what were described as ‘surgical strikes’ on Pakistani militants.¹⁵

Previous governments had conducted small reprisal raids in the 1990s and 2000s, so the operation was not as radical as the government and its supporters claimed.¹⁶ But it was a rupture with the past in several ways. The apparent geographic scope was larger, with the targets spanning 200 kilometres across the LoC. There was a high degree of inter-agency coordination, with India’s foreign-intelligence organisation and its Earth-observation satellites pressed into service. Above all, the decision to go public was a major departure from the private signalling of the past. So too was the tacit approval of the United States; White House National Security Advisor Susan Rice spoke to her Indian counterpart by phone shortly before the attack. Pakistan, ordinarily eager to point out Indian aggression, flatly denied that anything untoward had taken place, though promptly activated forward air bases and beefed up border defences.
In India, the meaning of the strikes continues to be debated. ‘Indian troops were like Hanuman who did not quite know their prowess before the surgical strikes’, boasted India’s defence minister, alluding to the monkey god of Hindu mythology who was cursed to forget that he possessed supernatural powers. Indian news anchors donned flak jackets and celebrated an act of military redemption. In truth, the raid is unlikely to have penetrated more than a few kilometres into Pakistan-controlled territory, and inflicted relatively small numbers of casualties. But it successfully probed Pakistan’s red lines and thereby established a public precedent for crossing the LoC in response to major provocations – something that India’s cautious leaders adamantly refused to do even during the Kargil War in 1999, at the cost of greater Indian casualties.

Perkovich and Dalton, whose book was published on 30 June, could not have imagined better publicity. ‘Indian leaders’, they had written in Not War, Not Peace, ‘are most likely to respond to another major terrorist attack by conducting largely symbolic airborne attacks on terrorist-related targets in Pakistan-administered Kashmir’ (p. 22). September’s raids were not airborne, but this was otherwise prescient. India deliberately signalled restraint by manipulating what Thomas Schelling called ‘cartographic psychology’. It confined its raid to the (provisional) LoC in Kashmir rather than the (permanent) international border to the south, allowing New Delhi to claim it was only intruding on territory it claimed as its own rather than into Pakistan proper. ‘Like virginity, the homeland wants an absolute definition’, Schelling had noted. ‘This character the Soviet bloc has been losing and may lose even more if it acquires a graduated structure like the old British Empire.’ The territory between India and Pakistan is similarly graduated, allowing each to probe the gaps. Indeed, Pakistan’s narrative of Kashmir obliges it to maintain the appearance that ‘Azad Kashmir’, though under its control, is politically distinct from the heartland.

**Home truths**

*Not War, Not Peace* deftly sets out the military, intelligence and political demands of such special-forces raids and other Indian options. The authors examine India’s ability to prosecute a limited ground war (pp. 73–103),
airstrikes (pp. 104–34), targeted assassinations and broader covert warfare aimed at destabilising Pakistan’s army or the country at large (pp. 135–79), and the nuclear capabilities and doctrines that would come into play should the use of these options spiral into a larger conflict (pp. 180–225). They are at pains to explain the difficulties involved. In this, they are helped by a revealing set of interviews with retired and serving diplomatic, intelligence and military officials from both India and Pakistan. Extended quotations are sprinkled liberally throughout the text, and they serve an important function. While Indians often chafe at foreigners talking down their armed forces or urging restraint, here we have knowledgeable Indians themselves delivering home truths.

A three-star military officer laments the ‘complete lack of understanding between civilian and military leaderships’, describing the situation as a ‘disaster’ (p. 33). ‘We might have acquired precision munitions’, admits a former intelligence officer, ‘but the data we have on [Pakistani] camps and infrastructure is not so accurate’ (p. 46). ‘You need constant intelligence with high accuracy, which we don’t have’, agrees a retired high-ranking air-force officer (p. 125). ‘Our capacity to act covertly has atrophied over the years’, complains another intelligence officer (p. 167). These details, though anecdotal and partial, and perhaps exaggerated in places, are important. In India as in the West, political leaders’ willingness to talk about and urge military options, without ever understanding their operational prerequisites and implications, encourages a sort of naïve militarism. Consider how the idea of the no-fly zone has been propounded in recent debates over Libya and Syria. We also see implausible extrapolations from permissive scenarios to far more contested ones. Shallow cross-border raids against lightly defended targets away from population centres, such as the September strikes or a raid into Myanmar in 2015 (pp. 137–9), may tell us relatively little about India’s ability to hit LeT’s sprawling headquarters just 30km from the city of Lahore. And while Pakistan was able to deny India’s September strikes, limiting the pressure for escalation, it would not be able to explain away larger, deeper, more visible raids.

But capabilities are less than half the story. Not War, Not Peace’s real achievement is to inject strategic thinking into a debate that focuses on means, rather than their connection to ends. If the aim is to push Pakistan’s
army to pacify terrorist groups in its patronage (pp. 40–3), then how do
ground wars, or airstrikes, or covert warfare achieve this end? ‘Can we hit
Pakistan?’ one retired Indian national security adviser recalls being asked in
a cabinet meeting. ‘Yes’, he answered, ‘but for what result?’ (p. 4).

The cynics’ answer is ‘votes’. One former Indian national security
adviser, Shiv Shankar Menon, has noted, tartly, that past ‘covert operations
were not announced to the country because the primary goal was to pacify
the LoC’, and ‘not to manage public opinion at home’. But as September’s
strikes demonstrated, the domestic political rewards can be substantial. The
opposition Congress Party, normally loath to offer even a hint of praise for
the government, quickly offered its congratulations, and rushed to publish
details of raids that it had authorised while in government, complete with
dates. India has forthcoming local elections in February 2017 in the massive
state of Uttar Pradesh. The BJP is open about campaigning on the back of
the strikes, with its election posters featuring prominent references to them
alongside photographs of Modi. Such appeals fall on fertile ground. A
recent Pew survey shows that a large majority (62%) of Indians believe that
using overwhelming military force is the best way to defeat terrorism, in
contrast to less than half of Europeans and Americans.

But domestic plaudits have no bearing on India’s true target, the calcula-
tions of Pakistan’s army. India can shape those calculations, but it faces an
unavoidable trade-off between impact and escalation (pp. 268–9). Modest
strikes can easily avoid escalation, but they offer no serious disincentive to
Pakistan. Larger strikes may threaten something of value to the Pakistani
army, but they would almost certainly prompt a broader war in which
India’s advantage would be slender and nuclear risks would quickly rise.
Another former national security adviser, M.K. Narayanan, who was in
office during the Mumbai attacks, has written that New Delhi forwent mili-
tary action in 2008 ‘not due to any fears of a possible nuclear conflict’, but
because ‘it was likely to be indeterminate’. Moreover, the adverse impact
on India’s economy and diplomatic standing could outweigh the original
cost of terrorism. And both Indian occupation of Pakistani territory and the
perception of heavy civilian casualties would catalyse support for Pakistan’s
army and jihadists (p. 84).
So while India can safely escalate beyond raids of a few kilometres, there is no plausible sweet spot at which Pakistan’s generals would unwind decades of policy on an issue – Kashmir, and the broader Indian threat – that they see as fundamental not just to their own corporate existence but to the nation’s survival, the two being much the same thing in their eyes. In October, Modi proudly boasted that the strikes proved India’s army was ‘no less’ than Israel’s, but Perkovich and Dalton argue that the comparison may be less than encouraging (p. 10). Neither highly proficient assassinations of Hizbullah commanders, nor frequent retaliatory airstrikes, nor even the full-fledged air and ground war which battered Beirut and southern Lebanon in 2006 have seriously weakened the group, nor Iranian support for it. Hizbullah has ten times as many rockets today as it did a decade ago, and Iran and Hizbullah work in lockstep in Syria in support of the Assad regime. Indeed, the combined might of the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia has not proven sufficient to limit Iran’s state sponsorship of armed militant groups of every ethnic and religious stripe. That sponsorship is too disaggregated to target cleanly, too focused on Arab and Israeli interests to incur global outrage, and ultimately too important to abandon because of foreign pressure alone.

How to win friends and compel people
‘A nuclear state’, noted Michael Quinlan, ‘is a state that no one can afford to make desperate’. Pakistan must therefore be induced to change tack out of rational calculation, not desperation. That requires continued control over territory. Much as Israel relies on Hamas to control other groups’ rocket strikes from Gaza, or the United States required regime support to disarm Syria of chemical weapons, India is in the paradoxical situation of requiring its neighbour’s army to be weak enough to pose a diminished threat, but strong enough to influence and eventually demobilise its proxies. ‘The Pakistan Army and the ISI would seem to be necessary instruments in dismantling or at least compelling militant groups to abandon terrorism’, suggest the authors (p. 86). While right-wing Hindu nationalists sometimes express a desire to see Pakistan break up, most serious officials understand that such an outcome would not be as benign as the transformation of East
Pakistan into Bangladesh in 1971 (p. 232). ‘The minute anyone says Pakistan might break up’, confesses a high-ranking Indian intelligence official, ‘that scares the shit out of me’ (p. 162).

Perkovich and Dalton do not spurn the threat or use of force. But they do argue that it is best pursued alongside ‘non-violent compellence’, particularly economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation (p. 280). This is difficult, because it cannot be pursued unilaterally. Pakistan’s relationship with the United States may have frayed, perhaps beyond repair, in the past five years. But Pakistan’s territory and ports, and the forces that guard them, play an important role in China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative, and Beijing continues to shelter its junior ally in the United Nations, most recently blocking efforts to add JeM leader Masood Azhar to the UN’s list of proscribed terrorists. Russia, a historic ally of India, is also moving closer to Pakistan, holding unprecedented joint exercises immediately after the Uri attack in September.

On the other hand, India’s new clout is yielding results. Writing pre-Uri, the authors had warned, reasonably, that ‘other states within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) would be reluctant to act against fellow member Pakistan’ (p. 247). But within weeks of the attacks, India succeeded in sabotaging the organisation’s forthcoming summit in Islamabad by peeling away Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan. Just as important was Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s acceptance of an invitation to be the chief guest at the India’s Republic Day celebrations in 2017, despite the UAE’s close defence ties to Pakistan. In October 2016, a highly controversial report in Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper suggested that even China was privately indicating to Islamabad that it would not shield Pakistan from international censure indefinitely. India’s own deepening defence ties to Washington, marked by a significant logistics agreement in August 2016, have also boosted India’s diplomatic efforts. It is clear, for instance, that American signals intelligence has played a role in helping India to attribute more than one terrorist attack to Pakistan-backed groups. Such attribution is crucial to India’s efforts to persuade third parties to apply pressure on Pakistan.

Even so, isolation is no panacea. Pakistan’s period of greatest isolation, in the 1990s, coincided with a surge in its support for regional militancy
Pakistan fuelled and transformed the Kashmiri uprising after 1987, instigated a mass-casualty bombing in Mumbai in 1993, nurtured the Taliban from 1994, and in 1999 used non-uniformed personnel to seize Indian outposts, provoking the Kargil War. Arguably, India was itself isolated in the early part of this period, facing nuclear sanctions, denunciation of its repression in Kashmir and the loss of its Soviet partner. This brings us to what may be the most important aspect of non-violent pressure: international cooperation. Such cooperation may come at a price.

Perkovich and Dalton emphasise that India’s ability to fashion an anti-Pakistan coalition depends not only on persuading others of Pakistani malfeasance, but also on Indian willingness to negotiate with Pakistan, including on the vexed question of Kashmir. ‘International actors become reluctant to apply pressure on one set of parties to a dispute if they do not believe that the other party is demonstrably committed to reach equitable outcomes too’ (p. 256). It is certainly possible to find examples of this: the international coalition against Iran fashioned between 2003 and 2015, for instance, would likely have weakened and ultimately collapsed had the United States or another member of the six-power negotiating bloc persisted with hardline positions, such as refusing Iran the right to enrich uranium. But in some ways, Perkovich and Dalton under-sell the case for talks, which they frame largely as signals of goodwill intended to secure international support in the event of their probable collapse. Yet the most important India–Pakistan dialogue of recent years, a back channel initiated just five years after the Kargil War and continued until 2007, nearly producing a historic agreement over Kashmir, was almost entirely secret. Talks intended solely as public gestures of flexibility, to be cashed in at a later date, will never achieve the discretion and seriousness necessary for resolving highly sensitive issues.

Some Indians would argue that their country can simply outgrow the problem. Others are less sanguine. ‘The state of our relationship with Pakistan’, writes Shiv Shankar Menon in his 2016 book Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, ‘has been an albatross that has hobbled Indian diplomacy and enabled other powers to gain leverage in India’s and the subcontinent’s affairs’. ‘India has the power and habits of mind and
institutions to win on its own a 100-year war of attrition with Pakistan’, concede the authors. ‘But India cannot achieve its ambitions to be a global power if it remains bogged down in such a war’ (p. 279). India’s present government agrees with the first of these statements, but seeks to refute the second. New Delhi’s new gamble is that calibrated punishment places the onus for escalation – and so the risk of further isolation – onto Pakistan. The best-case scenario is a return to the detente of the mid-2000s, but no less likely is a new, more violent equilibrium.

Notes

6 For an excellent summary of India–Pakistan competition since the late 1990s, see Myra MacDonald’s forthcoming *Defeat Is an Orphan: How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asian War* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2016).
Raiders in Kashmir: India’s Pakistan Problem


206  |  Shashank Joshi


Fair, Fighting to the End, p. 173.


Michael Quinlan, Thinking About
Raiders in Kashmir: India’s Pakistan Problem


