China, India, and the “Whole Set-Up and Balance of the World”

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ABSTRACT

This article is a first cut at exploring the connection between the bilateral Sino-Indian relationship and China’s interaction with, and adaption to, global structures. It surveys Sino-Indian relations, documenting the reversal of the co-operative trend that had prevailed for three decades. It argues that the deterioration of relations, in the context of an unresolved territorial dispute and an intensifying classical security dilemma, raises the probability of armed conflict, a militarized dispute, or a crisis. It thereby risks undermining Beijing’s hitherto successful grand strategy of reassurance. It further contends that Sino-Indian enmity, aside from complicating bilateral co-operation, also hinders the formation and sustenance of institutions and regimes.

Introduction

India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, told his cabinet in the 1950s that “India and China at peace would make a vast difference to the whole set-up and balance of the world.” At a time when the two states jointly comprised less than a tenth of the world economy, this was a claim of some audacity. Today, that figure has risen to a fifth. Moreover, Nehru’s statement is overlaid with the bitter irony of an intervening war, in which India was handed a resounding defeat. The Sino-Indian relationship is more than just a quasi-microcosm of its more important Sino-American equivalent, as has been sometimes assumed. Nor is it only relevant to understanding occurrences on the long, largely Himalayan border that has separated the two since China annexed Tibet in 1950 and that now comprises the longest disputed border on earth. Previously, the ties between India and China have been analysed through these two dominant lenses—US foreign policy and territory—without an understanding of how the bilateral relationship pertains to broader concerns. The argument below contends that global structures, and China’s adaption to them, are conditioned in important ways by the process in which Beijing and New Delhi interact and how this is perceived by Asia and

the world. In particular, it suggests that the emerging trend of an uneasy peace may presage a more awkward process of Chinese integration than would be the case had Sino-Indian relations been characterized by trust and amity instead.

Global structures can be understood in a number of ways. These include: “the rules and principles of international relations”;5 “principles, norms, rules, and procedures”;6 or a “logic of anarchy” and its organizational manifestations.7 These are all suitable definitions, each with subtly different empirical referents. Nonetheless, they remain centred on one thing: the idea of international order, or what Nehru referred to as the “set-up and balance of the world.”8

Here, following Alastair Iain Johnston, I understand global structures to entail “extant institutions, norms, and power distributions.”9 Throughout, it is important to hold in view the caveat that many of these definitions assume, rather expansively, that “there is an extant international community [or order] that is sufficiently well defined such that it is obvious who [and what] is and who [and what] is not part of it.”10 These three concepts require further definition. Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions.”11 They are most commonly understood as formal organizations. Norms are “intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action.”12 Power distributions include the distribution of material power, but also the configuration of ideas that imparts meaning to that material distribution.13

Sino-Indian bilateral relations have been explored in considerable detail over recent years, and the conflictual trends well documented. But fewer scholars and observers have explicitly related these to the wider phenomenon of, in cultural shorthand, “the rise of China.”14 Where the connection has been made, it frequently stresses the convergence of interest between rising powers. The Economist (in a largely perceptive article) concluded that, “[O]n important international issues, notably climate-change policy and world trade, [Sino-Indian] alignment is already imposing.”15 This episodic co-operation is undoubtedly of great consequence for global structures—though not always in ways perceived as constructive by established powers, as Sino-Indian solidarity at the Copenhagen Summit of 2009 demonstrated. However, I contend that Sino-Indian enmity, rather than amity, is of equal significance to these three components of global structures—instutions, norms, and (interpretations of and reactions to) power distributions.

It is instructive to consider that a Sino-Indian crisis or armed conflict, however limited in scope, would inflict grave damage upon China’s “de facto grand strategy [of seeking] to maintain the conditions conducive
to China’s continued growth and to reduce the likelihood others would unite to oppose China.”

This strategy has been pursued through the active reassurance of would-be balancers, such as Southeast Asian nations. The bilateral relationship is, therefore, germane to the interpretation of power distributions or what the literature calls the balance of threat.

The article proceeds in three parts. First, I briefly lay out the evolution and present state of Sino-Indian relations. I argue that a modest, but observable and important, rise in enmity has occurred over the recent period, reversing the secular trend that has prevailed since the 1980s. Second, I construct an argument that relates these bilateral dynamics to global structures. I focus both on the prospect of Sino-Indian conflict directly undercutting China’s grand strategy of reassurance by altering local and systemic perceptions of Chinese intentions, and also on the indirect effects this would have on China’s ability to shape the global structure in ways of its choosing. This is the primary focus of this paper. Third, I raise the question of whether bilateral enmity also makes it harder for the two states to co-operate in sustaining regimes and, more broadly, providing public goods.

**Three Phases of Sino-Indian Relations**

**1947–62**

Sino-Indian relations have moved through three broad phases. The first period, after Indian independence and the Chinese revolution, saw Jawaharlal Nehru articulate a vision of two civilizations co-operating to end balance-of-power politics and assisting in the emancipation of other regions afflicted by colonialism. As late as 1959, Michael Brecher could note in his seminal biography of Nehru that “friendship with China has been an axiom of Indian foreign policy during the past decade.” Indeed, the prime minister “view[ed] the establishment of the Peking [sic] regime as the culminating act in a century old process of revolution and as a manifestation of Asia’s political renaissance.” But intense border negotiations towards the end of the 1950s gave way to increasing recriminations and, in 1962, a short but serious border war.

**1962–88**

The subsequent years were characterized, according to one account, by an “acutely strong sense of victimhood and its corollary, a sense of enti-
tlement and recovery” on the part of defeated India. The second phase of Sino-Indian relations stretched from 1962 until 1988, during which China abetted insurgencies on Indian soil and favoured Pakistan in episodes of conflict such as the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.

1988–2010

In 1976, diplomatic relations cautiously resumed; and in 1979, Indian Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee (later prime minister) visited China. Eight rounds of talks took place from 1981 to 1988, and in 1988 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made a landmark trip to Beijing. During this third phase, “official and elite Chinese discourse on the Sino-Indian boundary literally dried up [and] the accusations against Indian transgressions of Chinese sovereign boundaries that had been the main source of official claims on such lines through the mid-1980s ceased to appear in the Beijing Review after 1988,” according to one careful study. Key confidence building measures in 1993 and 1996 were regarded as “crowning achievements in the long process of normalizing bilateral relations between the two countries.” These were followed by a landmark “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Co-operation” in 2003 and a further agreement in 2005. This did not restore the status quo ante-bellum, but it did constitute progress.

It has long been the case that:

India’s contemporary China-watching continues to sustain two parallel discourses: one extreme sees China as incorrigibly aggressive and expansionist, and the other extreme perceives it as a benign neighbour, a sister ancient civilisation, more sinned against than sinning in modern times.

Yet despite the medium-term co-operative trend, the latter view has not won out. Sino-Indian antagonism has not only persisted, but also, over the last five to ten years, escalated in important respects. Before India’s 1998 nuclear tests, India’s then-Defence Minister, George Fernandes, labelled China “potential enemy number one.” Justifying the tests to President Clinton, India’s then-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee wrote of “an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962,” and one with which “an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem.” This provoked considerable anger in Beijing.

Vajpayee’s notional discretion in failing to name China only evidences the divergence between public and private norms of discourse in India, according to which “steady composure in New Delhi’s public
statements about China [would be] coupled with lingering suspicion of Beijing in private.” In other words, this suspicion was common diplomatic knowledge. The alarmism peaked when Bharat Verma, editor of the reputable *Indian Defence Review*, forecast that “China will launch an attack on India before 2012 …[.] thereby ensuring Chinese supremacy in Asia in this century.”

The evolution of India’s nuclear arsenal in the decade after 1998 has also been focused on China rather than Pakistan. The intention was, and remains, to more robustly deter China’s numerically and qualitatively superior arsenal. This has included the development of a sea-based deterrent that overcomes many of the limitations of range and reliability that afflict the land- and air-based delivery systems (India still lacks delivery systems capable of reaching China’s eastern seaboard).

Equally importantly, after India commenced a historic rapprochement with Washington in 2005, exemplified by a civil nuclear co-operation agreement that came to fruition in 2010, China appeared to undertake a shift in policy (though establishing causality is far from simple). Harsh Pant has written that “Sino-India frictions are growing and the potential for conflict remains high.” Pant, echoing a widespread and longstanding Indian perception of containment, argued that “China has actively pursued policies to prevent the rise of other regional powers.” In 2007, a joint naval exercise between India, Australia, the United States, and Japan further sharpened these Chinese fears. Brahma Chellaney, a prominent Indian defence analyst, documented a “perceptible hardening of China’s stance towards India,” decried its “creeping propensity to flex its muscles,” and accused Beijing of renewing its Mao-era support for the various insurgencies flecked across India’s periphery.

These views are not confined to the academy and press. Vikram Sood, the former head of India’s foreign intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), observed a “gradual and disturbing shift in the Chinese attitude towards India in the past few years.” Bharat Karnad, an influential strategist and co-author of India’s first draft nuclear doctrine, judged India to be “involved in a subtle strategic tussle to thwart China’s plans to establish dominance in the extended region.” In the seventh century, the Tang Dynasty monk and traveller Yi Jing asked, “Is there anyone in any part of India who does not admire China?” Today, the question could be answered with ease.

**Tensions**

These tensions have two foci: territory and strategic competition.
First, and most important, is the unresolved territorial dispute. China proposed a swap of territorial claims (very roughly, Aksai Chin in the west, controlled by China after 1962, for what is now Arunachal Pradesh, entirely administered by India since 1951, in the east) in the negotiations from the late 1950s to 1962, and in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{42} It repudiated this approach in 1985, perhaps as a result of India’s insistence on pressing claims in each sector rather than treating a settlement as a joint package.\textsuperscript{43} After 2006, China appeared to press its claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh through official rhetoric and, arguably, a rise in patrols or activity that was interpreted as such.\textsuperscript{44} Since both the cartographic boundary and its actual demarcation on the ground remain in dispute, “transgressions” are frequently mutual misunderstandings and may reflect nothing more than the decades of border infrastructural upgrades undertaken by China on all of its frontiers over the last decade.\textsuperscript{45}

Nonetheless, whether signal or noise, these reports of increased perceived incursions coincided with China pressing its claim through other channels. Most notably, in April 2009, China attempted to block a substantial Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan, part of which was destined for projects in Arunachal Pradesh.\textsuperscript{46} Later that year, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh conducted election campaigning in the state, and the Dalai Lama visited its town of Tawang (to which he had fled in 1959). Both actions drew unusual condemnation from Beijing.\textsuperscript{47}

\textit{Strategic Competition}

Second, overlaying and interacting with the territorial dispute is the strategic dynamic.\textsuperscript{48} This comprises both a military and diplomatic dimension. A range of actors in India are concerned that the general military modernization underway by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the series of diplomatic successes enjoyed by Beijing with states on India’s periphery (including traditional protectorates) have furnished China with a range of coercive options. The effect is to reduce India’s security and render Delhi unacceptably vulnerable to pressure and, in extremis, militarized conflict.\textsuperscript{49}

China’s primary strategic concern has been to safeguard its perceived sovereignty, which entails the defence of Taiwan against possible American military intervention and the suppression of separatism in Tibet and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{50} In the course of addressing this concern, Tibet’s military infrastructure has undergone dramatic improvement such that
Indian planners assume two Chinese divisions could be mobilized in 20, rather than 90 to 180 days as previously thought. China’s two military regions bordering India comprise 400,000 troops (a fifth of the country’s total). China’s naval strength far outstrips that of India, and its anti-access force posture, intended to hobble the use of large surface ships such as aircraft carriers, indirectly aims at India’s vulnerabilities. The military balance is not lopsided in the extreme, and there are reasons to assume a moderate defensive advantage, but perceived vulnerability has produced a conscious Indian response.

Of the diplomatic realm, John Garver writes with considerable understatement that “Beijing and New Delhi are at odds about the political-military regime regulating the Himalayan massif.” China’s longest and deepest relationship is with Pakistan, to which it has transferred arms, ballistic missile and nuclear warhead designs, weapons grade uranium, and advanced aircraft such as the J-10 fighter. But China has also strengthened its ties to Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar—all states to which India has had a hierarchical relationship and in which India has historically resisted the influence of extra-territorial powers.

China’s diplomacy is explicable in terms of the pursuit of energy security, competition with American influence, observation of American naval activities, and the general desire to translate increased resources and stature into influence. Yet the string of embryonic naval facilities, largely intended to protect China’s crucial sea lines of communication, can be interpreted by India as malign in intent and effect. As David Shambaugh writes in a study of Chinese military modernization, “[S]ince the late 1980s, China has been concerned that India not become the dominant power in South Asia or the Indian Ocean.” Harsh Pant likewise cites “a secret memorandum issued by the director of the General Logistic Department of the P.L.A.,” in which the latter supposedly maintained that “we can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians … [W]e are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.” This threat, alongside the proliferation of Sino-subcontinental bilateral ties, both necessarily reduce India’s latent power position and stoke fears, however exaggerated or speculative, of gradual Chinese domination of the region. Many who discount the military value of several of these developments still acknowledge the consolidation of China’s regional position.

At root, each domain of Sino-Indian disagreement is a conflict over scarce resources, whether territory or influence. A heightened security dilemma, even an asymmetrical one, is likely to reduce both the level of resources that each state is willing to concede to the other and the risks each state is willing to undertake in the pursuit of a settlement.
Through each of these channels, the probability of bargaining failure, whether that bargaining is explicit (the border dispute) or implicit (naval competition), rises; thus so too does the probability of armed conflict.\(^6\) That there exists a large volume of economic exchange, and that a range of actors on each side continue to hold status quo and risk-averse preferences, does not negate this logic. Nicholas Burns, a former American diplomat who negotiated the US-India nuclear agreement, has judged that the Sino-Indian relationship is “exceedingly troubled and perturbed,” and that it will remain “uneasy for many years to come.”\(^6\)

This is a succinct and logical conclusion.

**Implications for Global Structures: Stability and Threat Perception**

The regression in bilateral relations has a series of wider consequences.

**Stability**

First, the security of Asia has been central to what is understood as international security. Marc Trachtenberg has argued that, owing to the web of understandings that had formed with the Soviet Union by 1963, President John F. Kennedy had judged that “Europe was quite secure militarily now,” such that it lay “probably eighth on our list of dangers.”\(^6\) It was East, Southeast, and South Asia where the fulcrum of the international system subsequently lay.\(^6\) The international system’s centre has only shifted farther towards Asia in the decades since the rise in growth rates of, chronologically, the Asian Tigers, Japan, China, and India.\(^6\) Moreover, “the [2007-10] financial crisis [has] highlighted the reality of a new order in Asia and to some extent in the world,” with Beijing capable of implementing a massive fiscal and monetary stimulus, and insulated from the worst financial contagion.\(^6\)

Geographic areas deemed more central to major power interests are correspondingly more central to the security dimensions of global structures.\(^6\) That being so, the backsliding in Sino-Indian relations, in an era where both are projected to be amongst the world’s three largest economies by 2050, bodes poorly for the prevailing threat perceptions amongst these future quasi-poles of the international system.
Second, a more interesting and less noted dynamic is the impact of Sino-Indian tensions on China’s grand strategy of reassurance. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown to thirteen times the size that it was in 1978, when major economic reforms began. Its share of world output has risen from two per cent in 1987 to ten per cent in 2010, and its share of world growth was over a fifth in the latter year, despite the collapse in world trade induced by the global financial crisis. And since 1990, rapid growth and the consolidation of central government control over tax revenues has enabled the PLA budget to rise in double-digit terms alongside a modernization of its equipment and doctrine. The 2010 report on China’s military capabilities, legally required of the United States Department of Defense, noted that “current trends in China’s military capabilities are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances, and could provide China with a force capable of conducting a range of military operations in Asia well beyond Taiwan.”

Other states therefore face, according to Evelyn Goh, “the imperative to gauge Beijing’s strategic intentions vis-à-vis the region and the world, in the short term as well as in the long run.” At one end of the spectrum, offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer argue that “if China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the US and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbours—including India … will join with the US to contain China’s power.” Mearsheimer’s pessimistic prediction assumes that the likelihood of a balancing coalition forming is unrelated to China’s behaviour. The underlying theory of conflict is highly simplistic, with power as the pre-eminent variable of interest. Susan Shirk distils the idea to its essence in arguing that “history teaches us that rising powers are likely to provoke war.”

This, however, does not appear consonant with the evidence available from the years of China’s increased (to be more precise, renewed) stature.

China’s efforts to deemphasize its rising power, employ its force with caution, and lessen its assertiveness have dampened regional threat perceptions. In one extensive study, Goh makes the case that a combination of astute Chinese diplomacy; a successful Southeast Asian regional security strategy; and the relative restraint exercised by China, the United States, and other major regional powers, have produced a reasonably stable regional order underpinned by continued American preponderance, growing Chinese engagement, and medium-power political activism.
Importantly, and in contrast with predictions made over the past decade, “none of these Southeast Asian countries identifies China as a threat [and] all ascribe to a strategy of vigorous engagement and attempted socialization of the PRC,” even as they “reserve judgment on whether China is ultimately a benign or threatening rising power.”

Goh adds that “in Southeast Asia, the China challenge has been transformed over the last fifteen years from being an unpredictable and thus threatening disruption to the regional status quo, to being an important source of continued economic development.” Central to this shift has been “Beijing’s altered [i.e., post-1980s] approach to the region and its astute diplomacy, as well as the relative restraint exercised by China.”

This indeed has been China’s intention. It has long been the case that “Beijing wishes to ensure that Southeast Asia is not alienated to another power antagonistic to it [and so] during the mid-1990s [the] foreign policy establishment in Beijing concluded that these aims would best be achieved through positive diplomacy, that is, by first cultivating benign perceptions of the PRC in order to mediate Southeast Asian worries about the China threat.” Thus “Beijing’s current aim is to ‘desecuritize’ China’s rise in order to allay regional concerns.” This conclusion is a recurrent one in the scholarly literature on the region.

For instance, Johnston notes that “from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, China moved from virtual isolation from international organizations to membership numbers approaching about 80 per cent of the comparison states.” In a separate book-length study, Johnston has demonstrated that “Chinese leaders adopted more cooperative and potentially self-constraining commitments to security institutions between 1980 and 2000 (mainly in the 1990s).” This, he argues, was a process driven by “a constituency of protomultilateralists who internalized a view of security that placed less stress on unilateral security and more on cooperative security strategies.”

Avery Goldstein develops the reinforcing argument that “by 1996, China apparently concluded that accepting the constraints that come with working in multilateral settings was preferable to the risk of isolation and encirclement and could help foster a reputation for responsible international behaviour.” This restraint lent credibility to the declaratory strategy of “peaceful rise” and its later incarnations such as “peaceful development.” This declaratory strategy was itself part of a general posture of reassurance that, over time, has been successful in fulfilling its purpose: averting a balancing coalition that would curb China’s rapid economic growth.

The relevance of the Sino-Indian dyad is that the persistent antagonism, underpinned by a historically sensitive territorial dispute and a classical (if uneven) security dilemma, threatens to harm the credibility
and effectiveness of China’s reassurance strategy and, therefore, render regional and other threat perceptions of China less benign. Importantly, there is evidence that prior instances of perceived Chinese belligerence or aggressive signalling have affected such perceptions.

The 1995–6 Taiwan Straits Crisis, initiated by Chinese missile tests in and around the Taiwan Strait, provoked not only the most significant American military demonstration in Asia since the Second World War, but also a rise in threat perceptions of China from third parties. In 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite missile test that drew protest from Britain, Australia, Canada, Japan, Taiwan, India, South Korea, and the European Union. It was argued that “while [the test] was a spectacular propaganda coup for the PLA, it simultaneously blew a hole through the Chinese government’s assiduous efforts to package China’s progress under the rubric of ‘peaceful development.’” Moreover, if it is correct to assume that “one can probably infer from the test that the PLA has greater autonomy in decision making than was formerly believed,” this signal of operative civil-military relations runs against the assurance of restraint central to China’s strategy. In 2010, China’s designation of disputed islands in the South China Sea as a “core interest” raised fears that it would adjust its willingness to use force. Later in the year, China rapidly and forcefully escalated a crisis with Tokyo when the latter detained the captain of a Chinese boat that had entered the waters of the disputed, but Japanese-controlled Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Japan’s threat to prosecute the captain under Japanese law was perceived by China as a threat to its own claim to the territories, but the scale and sharpness of its response made waves across East Asia.

Other states’ inference of revisionist, assertive, expansive, or simply risk-acceptant preferences from Chinese behaviour is only one facet of this dynamic. Episodes such as the “stunning demonstration of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities” are widely seen as an intentional assertion of China’s ability to strike at American vulnerabilities. They are not simply important because they cause transnational learning of the sort that undermines China’s reassurance, but also because they concurrently furnish domestic hardliners with resources to justify and persuade others of confrontational stances against China. Since domestic conditions mediate any security dilemma, whether that between India and China or between China and those with whom it faces island disputes. The signals in the course of Sino-Indian interaction are germane to China’s rise as a general phenomenon.

China’s ability to adapt to and shape global structures is at least partly conditioned by its acceptance as a non-threatening power with which engagement is worthwhile in lieu of outright containment. If the
outstanding territorial dispute between India and China were to result in a major stand-off or armed clash in Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh, or elsewhere; if a dispute over China's assistance to Pakistan or its influence in India's neighbours was to escalate to a militarized level (involving, say, partial mobilization or merely military enhanced readiness); if low-level and currently routine patrols were to produce skirmishes and so escape the confines of extant confidence building measures, then the ease of that acceptance, and the hitherto success of China's reassurance that its growth will coexist with peaceful interaction, would be at greater risk.

The potential for such inadvertent signalling is sharpened by the fact that India is a regional actor perceived as largely benign by the putative balancers. In 1991, India launched a “Look East” policy whereby it intensified its engagement of Southeast Asia and ASEAN in economic and then security areas. This also afforded ASEAN member states the opportunity to diversify their alliance portfolio, mitigating a reliance on China, Japan, or the United States. Goh argues that “the major Southeast Asian states—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—acknowledge that they cannot avoid being part of the ambit of the big powers, but they share a desire not to fall within the exclusive sphere of one great power.” Sino-Indian antagonism ensures that such states will perceive India as naturally consonant with their own leanings, without being overly threatening by dint of distance, history, or capabilities. This is a judgment that enjoys pre-existing credibility because “India does not have a historical legacy of invasion or domination in the region.” As such, it is reasonable to suppose that it enjoys a greater degree of trust in general. The slowdown in Sino-Indian rapprochement therefore not only risks undermining China's reassurance strategy, but also encouraging precisely the type of balancing coalition that China deems provocative.

This is a highly qualified conclusion. States will differ in how they interpret other states' actions. Learning processes differ considerably, and some will possess relatively high thresholds for revising their assessments of Chinese intentions. Moreover, a fuller version of this argument would require assessing how other states have reacted to the escalation of tensions in the past, the conditions under which these states have reassessed China's preferences, and whether these prior patterns accord with the circumstances posited here. This requires a wider study than that envisioned in this paper. Nonetheless, there is prima facie plausibility to the idea that images of China could be affected adversely by the perception that its willingness to employ force in the pursuit of its salient interests is higher than was previously thought.
Implications for Global Structures: Organizations, Regimes, and Co-operation

There are a number of other ways in which intensified Sino-Indian competition bears on “extant institutions, norms, and power distributions.”

Organizational Development

The first is the impact on organizational development. Whereas ASEAN has acquired considerable scope and depth in Southeast Asia, South Asia—understood here as India and its periphery, stretching as far as Afghanistan in the west to Myanmar in the east—is an institutionally thin region.\(^1\) The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been a largely ineffective body. It is notable more for the meetings of Indian and Pakistani officials that take place on the sidelines of summits than either major co-operative initiatives or the imposition of costly restrictions on unilateral state action.\(^2\) Stephen Cohen observes that “almost all Indians, especially the realist-hawks, are wary of [SAARC], preferring to deal with neighbours on a bilateral basis.”\(^3\) Moreover, “the smaller members are vulnerable to Indian pressure concerning the focus of SAARC initiatives.”\(^4\) This perpetuates a basically hierarchical relationship wherein there is little scope for genuinely multilateral action of the sort that has taken place within ASEAN. Within ASEAN, this has taken place on the basis of “non-interference in the internal affairs of one another,” a core component of the “ASEAN Way.”\(^5\) India has implicitly rejected any such formalized restriction on its behaviour. This is evident, for instance, from its highly interventionist conduct during the Nepalese peace process since 2006.\(^6\)

Not only is the attitude of India and China towards institutions divergent, but the two are also powers rising in the absence of mitigating or guiding institutions. The only overlapping institutions are those that are used instrumentally or notionally, such as the UN Security Council (Cohen notes that, for India, “the United Nations is seen as a dangerous place, where India runs the risk of having its Kashmir policies come under critical scrutiny, and perhaps fresh UN resolutions, and even sanctions”) or those in which India and China play peripheral roles (such as ASEAN’s Asian Regional Forum). Institutional change ordinarily occurs optimally after the resolution of conflict, rather than during its incidence. It also occurs optimally through the calculated actions of an effective hegemon, rather than purely horizontally between
interested parties unable to enter into credible commitments and without complete information.109 These two conditions are not fulfilled in the Sino-Indian case.

The relevant hegemon, the United States, possesses ever-decreasing leverage, at least in orthodox material terms; suffers from almost equally frayed relations with China; remains prepared to fight a major war with China over Taiwan; and controls a series of bilateral military alliances in Asia of the sort that China deems hostile to its own preferred regional order.110 China has been granted observership in SAARC but, notwithstanding that institution’s ineffectiveness, its entry was opposed by India, as well as Nepal and Bhutan. India relaxed its opposition only when Japan was admitted as an observer and Afghanistan was granted membership. Similarly, China only agreed to India’s observership at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after Russia accorded the same right to Pakistan.111

Prior to the first East Asian Summit in December 2005, there was extensive debate over the inclusion of India. According to the People’s Daily, a Chinese Communist Party outlet, “ASEAN diplomats believe [that] Japan is trying to drag countries outside this region such as Australia and India into the community to serve as a counterbalance to China.”112 The truth, according to a detailed study of Southeast Asian perceptions of China, is that Singapore and Indonesia—in addition to Japan—had “lobbied successfully to include India …[,] thereby undermining its [i.e., the East Asian Summit’s] potential as the premier China-led regional institution.”113 These regional institutions, which elsewhere in Asia have operated well, have not therefore provided fertile grounds for Sino-Indian co-operation. The aforementioned episode of China’s attempted blocking of an ADB loan, part of which was destined for disputed territory, indicates the potentially harmful relationship between the bilateral rivalry and the efficient functioning of multilateral institutions.114

Theoretical work reinforces this conclusion. Social constructivist International Relations theory, and particularly the burgeoning literature on socialization in international institutions, suggests that bilateral agreements will be qualitatively less effective than their multilateral counterparts in promoting co-operative behaviour and norms.115 Thus, bilaterally grounded co-operative actions such as the agreement not to threaten or use force to resolve the border dispute (codified in the 1993 Sino-Indian confidence building measures) are only superficially akin to, and in reality far less effective than, the processes operative in the multilateral environment of ASEAN and its affiliated organizations with which China has interacted and in which it has been partly socialized. The poor state of Sino-Indian relations reinforces this institutional pov-
erty and encourages the two states to tread warily before entering into an institutional relationship that would entail bearing short-term costs or risks.\textsuperscript{116}

\textit{Regimes}

Organizations are not the only component of global structures. India and China have interacted in ways that also affect both regimes and global norms. At the 2009 Copenhagen Summit directed at climate change mitigation, India and China (along with Brazil and South Africa) cooperated to resist the imposition of a legally binding target for carbon-dioxide emissions on the basis that it threatened to limit their economic growth rates.\textsuperscript{117} This was despite domestic criticism in India that, as a relatively low per-capita emitter, it had supplied China with political cover for pursuing its own interests.\textsuperscript{118} In this case, Sino-Indian co-operation, which took place despite the range of disagreements documented above, was widely perceived as antithetical to an envisioned climate change regime with binding provisions.

In this issue area, there is no clear status quo. Existing poles of the international system hold a variety of positions, and the desired shape of a future regime is highly uncertain.\textsuperscript{119} Yet the convergence of a Sino-Indian position played a crucial role in the evolution of a regime whose effectiveness could bear significantly on global stability. In issue areas where the Sino-Indian position is divergent, such as the regime for nuclear non-proliferation, China has defended some elements of the regime, such as its opposition to granting India a waiver from Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on nuclear trade to nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (\textit{npt}) non-signatories.\textsuperscript{120} It has concurrently undermined other elements with precisely the same counter-Indian rationale, as in the case of China’s ongoing nuclear assistance to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{121}

The net effect of Sino-Indian competition on international regimes is ambiguous and likely depends on the pattern of interests specific to the given issue area. Conflict and co-operation have co-existed in most issue areas. Chinese and Indian energy companies, including state-owned entities, have co-operated to develop oil fields. In 2005, the China National Petroleum Corporation jointly bid for a Syrian field with India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, after which a 2006 agreement set out plans to continue such bidding.\textsuperscript{122} Co-ordination has also taken place for assets in Columbia, Iran, Sudan, and Syria.

But this sporadic harmonization of bids hardly amounts to a regime. Indeed, “in the energy sphere, China-India interaction has tended to be competitive rather than cooperative,” with competition dominating in
Kazakhstan, Ecuador, Angola, and Burma (with the value of the co-operative bids generally lower than those for which the two states or their companies have competed). Moreover, “in every case, China has prevailed, not necessarily by offering a higher bit than India but rather by adopting a more strategic and holistic approach that integrates financial incentives with aid, infrastructure projects, diplomatic incentives, and arms packages.” Even in the cases where cooperation has taken the form of joint ownership, India’s share has been the smaller (except in the case of the aforementioned Syrian joint bid, where the Indian share has been equal).

As Sumit Ganguly succinctly concludes in a piece of Congressional testimony, “[A]lthough some analysts in India’s strategic community do harbor hopes of potential cooperation between India and China in their global quest for energy resources, these hopes represent the triumph of fond wishes over harsh realities. India is in a fundamentally competitive if not conflictual relationship with China.”

Two important points emerge. First, the limited co-operation that has taken place has done so on a largely ad hoc basis. It has been unmediated and unassisted either by self-sustaining, multilateral, autonomous, influential, or empowered institutions, or by transnational and non-political epistemic communities. This underscores the “institution pessimism” laid out above.

Second, Sino-Indian competition has had secondary effects on less salient aspects of global structures. In Myanmar, India has long faced a “dilemma … that its own morally gratifying record of supporting democratic governments [there] … poses a threat to the present Burmese military regime” and therefore lessens India’s influence with regard to interests that include access to energy. Although India’s policy had moved towards engagement by 1991, even a thirty per cent stake in Myanmar’s Shwe gas field and the offer of soft loans did not change Myanmar’s decision to sell that field’s gas to China. India’s response has been to continue a dilution of the democratization component of its foreign policy.

In other words, India’s attempt to compete with China for access to energy (and, we can suppose, influence over the government in Myanmar) has contributed to a corresponding weakness in the Indian commitment to—arguably tenuous—global norms of democracy promotion. It is true, of course, that China would place a low value on adhering to such norms in the absence of intense competition; this has been the trend in its dealings with energy-rich African states, where competition with India is both less intense and occurs only in certain domains. Nor
is it likely that more benign Sino-Indian relations, even in the event of a
settlement of the border dispute, would suddenly produce a Sino-Indian
effort to collaborate on democracy promotion. But the intensification
of competition does appear to have influenced India’s shift towards an
accommodationist policy. Competition has thereby affected the strength
of the normative regime in the context of a state—Myanmar—perceived
as a major violator of its precepts. The global normative structure in
favour of such norms frequently relies on external pressure to compel
greater regime legitimacy. A competitive Sino-Indian dynamic subverts
that pressure.

Public Good Provision

This is a special case of a wider phenomenon. The global structure con-
sists, in part, of public goods and the array of means for their provision
(such as institutions, regimes, and expectations). Maritime security
suggests another example. Gurpreet Khurana argues that “if insecurities
in the Southeast Asian waterways increase a few years from now, India
and China could even request each other’s help in escorting selected
vessels carrying vital commodities; the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean
and Southeast Asian straits, and the Chinese Navy in the East and South
China Sea.” A large majority of China’s, and half of India’s, oil imports
pass through the Straits of Malacca, and concerns over the vulnerability
of these sea-lanes drive much of the former’s diplomacy. Like the en-
forcement of democratic norms, the security of sea-lanes is understood
to be a public good.

But China and India can hardly be expected to jointly patrol sea-
lanes when the former’s activities in that realm remain a source of fear
for a non-trivial portion of India’s strategic community, regardless of the
possibility that Chinese intentions are not directed to this end. India
has historically displayed suspicion at what it saw as “extra-regional”
navies, ineffectually demanding that they withdraw from her maritime
backyard. In the context of India’s own Sino-centric naval moderni-
zation, the suggestion of a fully-fledged regime—“around which actor
expectations [can] converge”—seems far-fetched. In this, as in so
many other areas, institutionalized co-operation is at the mercy of a pre-
carious bilateral dynamic.
Conclusion

This article has argued that the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, alongside the baseline strategic mistrust between the two states, is of more than bilateral consequence. In at least two important respects, the antagonism between New Delhi and Beijing has an impact on global structures, understood here as “extant institutions, norms, and power distributions.”

First, the increased prospect of armed conflict that results from the interaction of a border dispute with a classical security dilemma risks inducing a crisis or militarized dispute. This, in turn, threatens to damage the basis of China’s successful strategy of reassurance. This would render more challenging the conditions under which China interacted with extant global structures, such as the Asian security community. Second, the mutual distrust between India and China hinders not just their co-operation within existing institutions, but also encumbers the formation of security institutions that can effectively mediate their rivalry and regional activities. More broadly, their competition may also be detrimental to the sustenance of international regimes, such as those governing the security of the maritime commons or democratic norms.

These mechanisms are not the only operative ones. China and India co-operate in a great number of areas, ranging from the rules governing world trade, climate change, and energy security. However, this co-operation is dampened by the concurrent security dilemma. Co-operation is sporadic and non-institutionalized, and less salient than the politico-military competition.

Notes

1 I am grateful to Hannah Cheetham and to an anonymous reviewer for comments.


10 Ibid., 8.


20 See Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2010), 7–8; Maxwell, India’s China War; Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis; D. K. Palit, War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962 (London: Hurst, 1991); Brij Mohan Kaul, The Untold Story (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967); and Chandar S. Sundaram and Daniel P. Marston, A Military History of India and South Asia: From the East India Company to the Nuclear Era (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), II.


23 See John W. Carver, “Sino-Indian Rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan En-


27 Singh, “India-China Relations,” 84.


30 See Yuan, “India’s Rise.”


35 Pant, “China Tightens the Screws on India,” 37 (emphasis added).

36 Pant, “Indian Foreign Policy and China,” 762.


40 Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy, 108.


64 The Economist, “Himalayan Rivalry.”


See Bergsten et al., China’s Rise, 2.


Goh, “Southeast Asian Perspectives,” 810.

Ibid., 824 (emphasis added).

Ibid., 828.

Ibid., 811.


Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-


89 Krishnan, India’s Security Dilemma, 48.


93 See Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51 (1998): 144–72, 156.

94 See Segal, “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment’ of China.”

95 See Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 211–3.


97 Goh, “Southeast Asian Perspectives,” 813.

98 Ladwig, “Delhi’s Pacific Ambition,” 12. India has, of course, used expeditionary

It has reacted to such groupings, whether in the form of military exercises or meetings, with hostility. India is wary of being pulled into such a coalition against its will, and is particularly resistant to American efforts to present US-India cooperation as directed at Beijing. This public sensitivity coexist with private sympathy to the notion of such balancing.


See Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 32–82.


Cohen, India, 57.

Ibid., 209.


Cohen, India, 57.


For basic elaborations of this logic, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Coop-


113 Goh, “Southeast Asian Perspectives” (emphasis added).

114 See Malik, “Bordering on Danger”; and Wong, “China and India Dispute.”


116 See Keohane, After Hegemony, 65–9.


See Krishnan, *India’s Security Dilemma*, 62.

Mitchell and Bajpaee, “China and India,” 157; see also Sikri, *Challenge and Strategy*, 68, 208.


See Pant, “India in the Asia-Pacific,” 279–82.


This does not preclude ad hoc co-operation, as in the domain of energy security.